$$k \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_{\mathsf{PRF}}()$$

$$b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$$

$$b' \leftarrow Win \text{ if } b' = b$$

$$\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{LR}} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{LR}} \leftarrow$$

FIGURE 12.2. "Hopped" security game G_1 for the scheme $c \leftarrow m \oplus Rand(0)$

 G_0 and G_1 respectively. We have the following relationships between the various probabilities:

(14)
$$\left| \Pr[b_0' = 1 | b_0 = 1] - \Pr[b_1' = 1 | b_1 = 1] \right| = \operatorname{Adv}_{\{F_k\}_K}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(A),$$

and

(15)
$$\left| \Pr[b_0' = 1 | \mathbf{b}_0 = 0] - \Pr[b_1' = 1 | \mathbf{b}_1 = 0] \right| = \operatorname{Adv}_{\{F_k\}_K}^{\mathsf{PRF}}(A),$$

i.e. for fixed b in both games the difference in the winning probabilities between the two games is the same as the advantage in distinguishing a member of a PRF family from a random function. Also note that

(16)
$$\Pr[b_1' = 1 | \mathbf{b}_1 = 1] - \Pr[b_1' = 1 | \mathbf{b}_1 = 0] = 0$$

since if we have a random function then an "encryption" of m_0 is a random string, as is an "encryption" of m_1 ; this is essentially the security of the one-time pad. Thus the probability of the adversary winning in game G_1 is equal to 1/2. Putting this together we have

$$\begin{split} \operatorname{Adv}^{\mathsf{IND-PASS}}_{\Pi}(A) &= \left| \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 1] - \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 0] \right| & \text{by definition} \\ &= \left| \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 1] \right. \\ & - \left(\Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 1] - \Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 1] \right) \\ & - \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 0] \right| & \text{adding zero} \\ &\leq \left| \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 1] - \Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 1] \right| \\ & + \left| \Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 1] - \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 0] \right| & \text{triangle inequality} \\ &\leq \operatorname{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRF}}_{\{F_k\}_K}(A) + \left| \Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 1] - \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 0] \right| & \text{by equation (14)} \\ &= \operatorname{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRF}}_{\{F_k\}_K}(A) + \left| \Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 1] - \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 0] \right| & \text{adding zero again} \\ &\leq \operatorname{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRF}}_{\{F_k\}_K}(A) + \left| \Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 1] - \Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 0] \right| & \text{triangle inequality} \\ &\leq \operatorname{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRF}}_{\{F_k\}_K}(A) + \left| \Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 0] - \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 0] \right| & \text{triangle inequality} \\ &= \operatorname{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRF}}_{\{F_k\}_K}(A) + \left| \Pr[b'_1 = 1 | b_1 = 0] - \Pr[b'_0 = 1 | b_0 = 0] \right| & \text{by equation (16)} \\ &\leq 2 \cdot \operatorname{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRF}}_{\{F_k\}_K}(A) & \text{by equation (15)}. \end{split}$$